- ISLAM WITHOUT ILLUSIONS
Theory and practice explained
The Calcutta Quran Petition
Sita Ram GoelNew Delhi, Voice of India, 1999, 3rd edition325 + xvi pages, Rs 150 (PB)
Reviewed by Dr. N.S. Rajaram
Background
The average educated person today, anywhere in the world, is likely to beboth confused and frightened by Islam. On the one hand, it is supposed to be areligion of peace that preaches equality and justice for all, while on the other, itis hardly possible to escape the sight of the most unspeakable acts of violencebeing committed by individuals and groups in its name.
To make the situation more confusing, there is no shortage of 'experts' - Eastern and Western - who tell us that Islamic terror is an aberration that has nothing to do with the 'true' Islam.It is fair to say that a majority of the people in the world has swallowed thisexplanation while remaining ambivalent about Muslims and their behavior.
In the book under review, Sita Ram Goel, one of the world's most incisive studentsof Islam, blows away this confusion by giving an unwarnished, scholarly yethighly readable account of the theory and practice of Islam. By a detailedanalysis of its scripture and history, he explodes the charade that Islamic terrorcan somehow be separated from its teachings. In the process, the prolific anderudite Mr. Goel has probably written his masterpiece.
To return to the confused state of knowledge about Islam, there has long been a need - more urgent today than ever before - for a work that can explain the theory and practice of Islam for the average reader. This void is now effectively filled by the book under review - 'The Calcutta Quran Petition' by Sita Ram Goel. His pluralistic Hindu background gives him a distinct advantage over his Western counterparts, who, despite their best efforts, cannot entirely break free of the shackles of their exclusivist Judeo-Christian heritage that springs from the same soil as Islam. Goel on the other hand looks at Islam as a complete outsider, disregarding its pious claims. If there is one book on Islam that a concerned person should read, it is his 'The Calcutta Quran Petition'. The book could with equal justice be titled 'Islam for Nonbelievers: Its scripture, history and practice'. The reason for the unusual title is historical. On 29 March 1985, one Chandmal Chopra filed a writ petition in the Calcutta High Court seeking a ban on the Quran under Sections 153A and 295A of the Indian Penal Code because it "incites violence, disturbs public tranquility, promotes, on the ground of religion, feelings of enmity, hatred and ill-will between different religious groups.
- religious communities, and insults other religions or religious beliefs of otherreligious communities of India." The Calcutta High Court disallowed thepetition, but the issues raised by it remain relevant, especially now when theneed to understand the causes of terror in the name of Islam is greater than ever.More significantly for the present discussion, it led Sita Ram Goel to write thevolume under review. The sordid details of the case in question would probablybe of little interest to the average reader today though they shed much light onthe ignoble conduct of the Governments of India and West Bengal in the face ofreal or perceived Muslim threats. Out of a total of 345 pages, the author devotesno less than 230 pages to a general discussion of Islam that has little directly todo with the Calcutta Petition. These pages, covering Chapters 2 through 10,
- constitute for all practical purposes an independent manual on Islam, beginningwith the message of the Quran. This is what is reviewed here.Quran and the HadisThe first point about the Quran is that it does not stand alone. The Suras(verses) of the Quran were created in specific situations arising out of specificmilitary, political and sometimes personal needs. They invariably reflect theconvenience of the Prophet who found it expedient to invoke Allah as authorityto have his own way with his people. Seeing this, his favorite wife A'sha onceobserved, "I find that Allah is prompt to proclaim commandments in accordancewith your desire." This means that the context in which a Sura was created isall-important. Taking Quranic passages out of context can lead to outlandishinterpretations like Sir Abdullah Suhrawardy's Sayings of Muhammad, whichMahatma Gandhi hailed in his Foreword as among the "treasures of mankind."The all-important context for interpreting the Suras of the Quran is providedby the Hadis. They may be described as the record of the activities of theProphet. They are so detailed, that it is possible to obtain a more or lesscomplete picture of the private and public life of the Prophet. It may fairly besaid that the Hadis rather than Quran form the basis for Islam, for without themthe Quran becomes virtually incomprehensible. As Goel makes clear (Chapter3) there is practically no difference between Allah and the Prophet; Allah doesat the Prophet's bidding. This made the great Maharshi Dayananda Saraswatiobserve, "Allah is the Prophet's domestic servant." As Goel explains, this makesthe Quran (the 'Word of Allah') and the Hadis ('Acts of Muhammad')interchangeable.In other words, the Hadis describe the Quran in action, meaning the acts ofthe Prophet. These in turn became the model of behavior to be emulated, for
- every true Muslim from the highest to the lowest. As Goel observes: "It is thisfixed and frozen image of the Prophet which is meant when a Muslim proclaimshis Din (fundamental faith). In fact the Prophet produced a 'revelation' (33.21)presenting himself as the perfect model for those who look forward (with hope)for the Day of Judgement. For a pious Muslim, human life is best lived when itconforms to Muhammad's conduct even in minor matters such as defecating... ,cutting one's beard to a specific size and so on. Islam leaves no room at all forindividual initiative or judgment...In case of doubt, a pious Muslim must go to a mufti (juriconsultant) andobtain a fatwa [ruling] about how the Prophet would have conducted himself ina situation which, according to all sources, the Prophet is not known to havefaced." Needless to say, this is not a climate conducive to progress.This has a sinister side with far-reaching implications. Since the later part ofthe Prophet's career is full of war and bloodshed in the name of Allah, religiouswar or Jihad is seen as the highest goal of Islam. What the world is faced today -from Kashmir to Kosovo (and now West Asia and Syria, pushing into Euurope)- is Jihad or religious war to bring the whole world under the sway of Islam.This reality cannot be wished away as is done by liberal academics in East andWest, by giving an abstract interpretation of Jihad. As Walter Laquer, anAmerican expert on terrorism observed, "Many interpreters of jihad in theMuslim world, and an equal number in the West, have explained that jihad has adouble meaning: it stands for jihad bi al saif (holy war by means of the sword)and also for jihad al nafs (literally, struggle for one's soul against one's own baseinstinct). Both interpretations are true, but Islamic militants have rejected thespiritual explanation as dangerous heresy. ...The Taliban in Afghanistan andmany militants (especially ISIS today) are not impressed by the speeches andwritings of more moderate exegetists about the 'poverty of fanaticism' and the'spiritual mission of Islam,' and this fact is what matters..."
- The fact of the matter is that influential Muslim leaders see the violentversion of Jihad as the only valid one. Jihad to them is "the most glorious wordin the vocabulary of Islam," and by this they don't mean striving for innerperfection. Goel explains this vital fact with clarity and thoroughness withprofuse illustrations from the history and scripture of Islam. As he points out,the Quran studied alongside the Hadis is a nothing but a manual on Jihad - orreligious war. Just as the Prophet became the model for Muslim behavior, hisblood soaked career became the model for a succession of Muslim leaders downto the present.While the Hadis are indispensable for understanding Islam, they present abewildering mass of detail to the uninitiated. In Chapter 4 ('The Prophet Sets thePattern'), the author takes the reader through the Prophet's career by presenting asystematic picture of the historical background and the key events. He describesalso two interesting episodes that are not widely known: the Prophet's invitation,in a time of distress, to the Christian Abyssinians to invade Mecca, claiming thathis teachings were no different from theirs; and the famous 'Satanic verses'inspired by the need to regain the support of the Meccans. In Chapter 5 ('TheOrthodox Exposition of Jihad'), the author produces evidence from primarysources to demolish the claim of modern apologists that Jihad has - or ever had -a spiritual meaning. This 'spiritual' interpretation is exhumed only when theyfeel insecure - as in India today, or when faced with powerful opponents like theUnited States - to be buried again when conditions turn favorable.Chapter 6 ('Jihad in India's History') may be read as a practicaldemonstration of Islam in action. It is to be hoped that every policymaker inIndia as well as the West will read this capsule account of the 'bloodiest story inhistory' - as Will Durant called it - and learn its lessons. Indians in particularmust face this historical truth and not seek escape in fantasies written by
A MUST READ FOR ALL NEW INDIAN ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE (IAS) OFFICER EXAMINATION CANDIDATES
Sunday, October 11, 2015
IF TRUE, CHECK IT OUT, THIS IS AN INEVITABLE REACTION TO THE JIHADI MOVEMENT HARASSING OTHER COUNTRIES
It has started .... Finally!
The first countries to ban Islam: See how the world is acting fast on the threat posed by Islam and its barbaric Sharia Law.
Japan has always refused Muslims to live permanent in their country and cannot own any real estate or any type of business, and have banned any worship of Islam. Any Muslim tourist caught spreading the word of Islam will be deported immediately, including all family members.
Cuba rejects plans for first mosque.
The African nation of Angola and several other nations have officially banned Islam.
Record number of Muslims, (over 2,000) deported from Norway as a way of fighting crime. Since these Muslim criminals have been deported, crime has dropped by a staggering 72%. Prison Officials are reporting that nearly half of their jail cells are now vacant, Courtrooms nearly empty, Police now free to attend to other matters, mainly traffic offences to keep their roads and highways safe and assisting the public in as many ways as they can.
In Germany alone in the last year there were 81 violent attacks targeting mosques.
Austrian police arrested 13 men targeting suspected jihad recruiters.
A Chinese court sends 22 Muslim Imams to jail for 16 to 20 years for spreading Islam hatred. and have executed eighteen Jihadists; China campaigns against Separatism (disallowing Islamises to have their own separate state). Muslim prayers banned in government buildings and schools in Xinjiang (Western China). Hundreds of Muslim families prepared to leave China for their own safety and return back to their own Middle Eastern countries.
Cuba rejects plans for first mosque.
The African nation of Angola and several other nations have officially banned Islam.
Record number of Muslims, (over 2,000) deported from Norway as a way of fighting crime. Since these Muslim criminals have been deported, crime has dropped by a staggering 72%. Prison Officials are reporting that nearly half of their jail cells are now vacant, Courtrooms nearly empty, Police now free to attend to other matters, mainly traffic offences to keep their roads and highways safe and assisting the public in as many ways as they can.
In Germany alone in the last year there were 81 violent attacks targeting mosques.
Austrian police arrested 13 men targeting suspected jihad recruiters.
A Chinese court sends 22 Muslim Imams to jail for 16 to 20 years for spreading Islam hatred. and have executed eighteen Jihadists; China campaigns against Separatism (disallowing Islamises to have their own separate state). Muslim prayers banned in government buildings and schools in Xinjiang (Western China). Hundreds of Muslim families prepared to leave China for their own safety and return back to their own Middle Eastern countries.
Muslim refugees beginning to realize that they are not welcome in Christian countries because of their violent ways and the continuing wars in Syria and Iraq whipped up by the hideous IS who are murdering young children and using mothers and daughters as sex slaves.
British Home Secretary prepares to introduce 'Anti-social Behaviour Order' for extremists and strip dual nationals of their Citizenship. Deportation laws also being prepared.
The Czech Republic blatantly refuses Islam in their country, regarding it as evil.
Alabama - A new controversial amendment that will ban the recognition of "foreign laws which would include sharia law".
The Polish Defence League issues a warning to Muslims. 16 States Have All Introduced Legislation to Ban Sharia Law.
Many Muslims in Northern Ireland have announced plans to leave the Country to avoid anti-Islamic violence by Irish locals. The announcement comes after an attack on groups of Muslims in the city of Belfast, Groups of Irish locals went berserk and bashed teenage Muslim gangs who were referring to young Irish girls as sluts and should be all gang raped, according to Islam and ''Sharia Law''.
British Home Secretary prepares to introduce 'Anti-social Behaviour Order' for extremists and strip dual nationals of their Citizenship. Deportation laws also being prepared.
The Czech Republic blatantly refuses Islam in their country, regarding it as evil.
Alabama - A new controversial amendment that will ban the recognition of "foreign laws which would include sharia law".
The Polish Defence League issues a warning to Muslims. 16 States Have All Introduced Legislation to Ban Sharia Law.
Many Muslims in Northern Ireland have announced plans to leave the Country to avoid anti-Islamic violence by Irish locals. The announcement comes after an attack on groups of Muslims in the city of Belfast, Groups of Irish locals went berserk and bashed teenage Muslim gangs who were referring to young Irish girls as sluts and should be all gang raped, according to Islam and ''Sharia Law''.
Even hospital staff were reluctant to treat the battered Muslim patients, the majority were given the Band-Aid treatment and sent home with staff muttering ''Good Riddance''.
North Carolina bans Islamic "Sharia Law" in the State, regarding it now as a criminal offence.
Dutch MP's call for removal of all mosques in the Netherlands. One Member of the Dutch Parliament said: "We want to clean Netherlands of Islam". Dutch MP Machiel De Graaf spoke on behalf of the Party for Freedom when he said, "All mosques in the Netherlands should be shut down. Without Islam, the Netherlands would be a wonderful safe country to live in, as it was before the arrival of Muslim refugees''.
North Carolina bans Islamic "Sharia Law" in the State, regarding it now as a criminal offence.
Dutch MP's call for removal of all mosques in the Netherlands. One Member of the Dutch Parliament said: "We want to clean Netherlands of Islam". Dutch MP Machiel De Graaf spoke on behalf of the Party for Freedom when he said, "All mosques in the Netherlands should be shut down. Without Islam, the Netherlands would be a wonderful safe country to live in, as it was before the arrival of Muslim refugees''.
Saturday, October 10, 2015
TWO MORE ANALYSES OF PSYCHOTIC JIHADI MOVEMENT POSING A THREAT TO WORLD POPULATION BUT PAVING THE WAY FOR MASS DESTRUCTION OF MAINLY MUSLIMS ON ITS WAY
Business Standard
Saturday, 10 October 2015
Global jihad and its discontents
By Talmiz Ahmed
·
Talmiz Ahmed examines two authoritative new books that explain the wellsprings and proliferation of radical Islam
Talmiz Ahmed October 10, 2015
The dramatic capture of Mosul by the Islamic State of Iraq and [Greater] Syria (ISIS) a little over a year ago, the lurid beheadings of Western and Arab hostages widely disseminated on social media, the extraordinary allure the movement seems to have for young people in different parts of the world, and the consolidation of the "caliphate" as a state, all these developments have led to a significant increase in literature relating to that organisation. The two books reviewed here are the latest in the series.
Jason Burke, the distinguished Guardian journalist, with a long stint in South Asia behind him, already has a high reputation for his earlier works on Al Qaeda and The 9/11 Wars. This book updates the jihad narrative. Burke divides contemporary jihad into three categories: two major organised groups, Al Qaeda and ISIS, with a regional presence and global reach and aspirations; a wide range of local groups operating in specific locales, with some contact with the two larger groups and with each other, and radicalised individuals, referred to as "inspired warriors", who act on their own, but are influenced by jihadi propaganda on the internet and obtain some training from established groups, mainly in Pakistan.
Burke notes that jihadi violence received a great fillip from the US-led "global war on terror", with radical groups leading the insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq. This confrontation created fatalities in the thousands: in 2001-11, about 250,000 were killed in the "9/11 wars"; in 2014, at least 180,000 were killed in jihad-related violence, mainly in the Muslim world. Burke notes that jihadis see their violence as a "cosmic struggle" against the evil West and seek to restore the lost glory of Islam and the Muslim people. However, beyond this, Islamic militancy is "diverse, dynamic, fragmented and chaotic", and is, at the same time, "profoundly contemporary", resulting from the political, economic, cultural and technological influences that resonate in our times.
Burke's book is comprehensive and written with balance, understanding and lucidity. There are just a few points on which I disagree with him. In regard to the "global jihad" organised in Afghanistan in the 1980s, I wish he had clearly stated that this was the initiative of three state powers - the US, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan - that organised it for short-term political advantage without understanding the full implications of what they had created.
In regard to encouraging the sectarian divide in Iraq, it is hard to believe, as Burke says, that the US administrators "appeared largely unaware" of Iraq's history, demographics and sectarian competition in the country; this was clearly a well-thought plan based on the time-honoured 'divide-and-rule' principle. Again, Burke says that in 2014, around 200 volunteers from India left their homes to join the ISIS in Syria, perhaps based on information provided by Indian officials at that time; the number even now does not seem to be more than five or six.
Burke devotes considerable space to Pakistani-origin UK nationals who were attracted to jihad in the 1990s and early 2000s, paid frequent visits to Pakistan and in some cases even participated in the violence in Kashmir. He, however, fails to note that, during this period, the mindset of jihad centred on the Kashmir issue permeated the Pakistan-origin community in the UK. This was well known to the British political and security authorities, who turned a blind eye to it and perhaps even rejoiced at India's discomfiture. (Recall here the several Amnesty reports in the 1990s castigating India for human rights abuses in Kashmir and elsewhere.) The radicalism of the UK-based Pakistani youth at that time and later should be traced to this accommodation of jihad by the British authorities.
I agree with Burke on the threat he sees from the various jihadi groups combining forces. Operational cooperation is already taking place and a number of factions of local jihadi groups have started expressing support for ISIS. The possibility of all these groups coming together under the umbrella of the Caliphate while retaining operational autonomy is not far-fetched. The political situation in West Asia is particularly propitious in this regard. This is an aspect that Jean-Pierre Filiu examines in his book.
Filiu, a well-known writer on Arab affairs, finds the wellsprings of jihad in the Arab political order. He sees the Arab Spring as a "revolution" constituting the "Arab struggle for collective emancipation". This aspiration, in his view, has been thwarted by the "deep state" structures of the despotic Arab states - an alliance of state intelligence, military, judiciary and organised crime - that has prevented the full expression of the aspirations for democracy of the Arab people. Thus, the Arab despots have been the principal beneficiaries of the events of 9/11: they were able to project to their western allies that they faced a threat from jihad, and worked closely with the West in the "global war on terror" by collaborating in renditions and "torture by proxy". As allies of western countries, they could also resist all demands for reform.
But the Arab despots also worked with jihadis: Ali Abdullah Saleh in Yemen actively collaborated with Al Qaeda, while obtaining increasing American largesse to boost his forces against the jihadi threat! Assad in Syria happily allowed jihadis to enter Iraq from his territory as part of the Sunni uprising in the early 2000s, and today refers to them as terrorists when they have initiated a rebellion against him. In August 2013, the cohorts of General Abdul Fattah al Sisi in Egypt massacred Brotherhood members who represented the country's popular politics; now, the country faces a jihadi threat in the Sinai, with regular reports of killings of army personnel. Though neither Burke nor Filiu have noted this, Saudi Arabia is said to be cooperating with Al Qaeda in its conflicts in Syria and Yemen today.
Filiu's book is a polemical work. Written with strong conviction, it is nevertheless supported by a deep knowledge of Arab history. Where his account is weak is in explaining how Arab despotism has encouraged the proliferation of jihad, particularly after the collapse of the Arab Spring. What is heartening, though, is that, in spite of the bleak scenario, the author asserts that the Arab revolution is not over and that the next generation of activists will be better prepared when it confronts the despots.
Jason Burke, the distinguished Guardian journalist, with a long stint in South Asia behind him, already has a high reputation for his earlier works on Al Qaeda and The 9/11 Wars. This book updates the jihad narrative. Burke divides contemporary jihad into three categories: two major organised groups, Al Qaeda and ISIS, with a regional presence and global reach and aspirations; a wide range of local groups operating in specific locales, with some contact with the two larger groups and with each other, and radicalised individuals, referred to as "inspired warriors", who act on their own, but are influenced by jihadi propaganda on the internet and obtain some training from established groups, mainly in Pakistan.
Burke notes that jihadi violence received a great fillip from the US-led "global war on terror", with radical groups leading the insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq. This confrontation created fatalities in the thousands: in 2001-11, about 250,000 were killed in the "9/11 wars"; in 2014, at least 180,000 were killed in jihad-related violence, mainly in the Muslim world. Burke notes that jihadis see their violence as a "cosmic struggle" against the evil West and seek to restore the lost glory of Islam and the Muslim people. However, beyond this, Islamic militancy is "diverse, dynamic, fragmented and chaotic", and is, at the same time, "profoundly contemporary", resulting from the political, economic, cultural and technological influences that resonate in our times.
Burke's book is comprehensive and written with balance, understanding and lucidity. There are just a few points on which I disagree with him. In regard to the "global jihad" organised in Afghanistan in the 1980s, I wish he had clearly stated that this was the initiative of three state powers - the US, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan - that organised it for short-term political advantage without understanding the full implications of what they had created.
In regard to encouraging the sectarian divide in Iraq, it is hard to believe, as Burke says, that the US administrators "appeared largely unaware" of Iraq's history, demographics and sectarian competition in the country; this was clearly a well-thought plan based on the time-honoured 'divide-and-rule' principle. Again, Burke says that in 2014, around 200 volunteers from India left their homes to join the ISIS in Syria, perhaps based on information provided by Indian officials at that time; the number even now does not seem to be more than five or six.
Burke devotes considerable space to Pakistani-origin UK nationals who were attracted to jihad in the 1990s and early 2000s, paid frequent visits to Pakistan and in some cases even participated in the violence in Kashmir. He, however, fails to note that, during this period, the mindset of jihad centred on the Kashmir issue permeated the Pakistan-origin community in the UK. This was well known to the British political and security authorities, who turned a blind eye to it and perhaps even rejoiced at India's discomfiture. (Recall here the several Amnesty reports in the 1990s castigating India for human rights abuses in Kashmir and elsewhere.) The radicalism of the UK-based Pakistani youth at that time and later should be traced to this accommodation of jihad by the British authorities.
I agree with Burke on the threat he sees from the various jihadi groups combining forces. Operational cooperation is already taking place and a number of factions of local jihadi groups have started expressing support for ISIS. The possibility of all these groups coming together under the umbrella of the Caliphate while retaining operational autonomy is not far-fetched. The political situation in West Asia is particularly propitious in this regard. This is an aspect that Jean-Pierre Filiu examines in his book.
Filiu, a well-known writer on Arab affairs, finds the wellsprings of jihad in the Arab political order. He sees the Arab Spring as a "revolution" constituting the "Arab struggle for collective emancipation". This aspiration, in his view, has been thwarted by the "deep state" structures of the despotic Arab states - an alliance of state intelligence, military, judiciary and organised crime - that has prevented the full expression of the aspirations for democracy of the Arab people. Thus, the Arab despots have been the principal beneficiaries of the events of 9/11: they were able to project to their western allies that they faced a threat from jihad, and worked closely with the West in the "global war on terror" by collaborating in renditions and "torture by proxy". As allies of western countries, they could also resist all demands for reform.
But the Arab despots also worked with jihadis: Ali Abdullah Saleh in Yemen actively collaborated with Al Qaeda, while obtaining increasing American largesse to boost his forces against the jihadi threat! Assad in Syria happily allowed jihadis to enter Iraq from his territory as part of the Sunni uprising in the early 2000s, and today refers to them as terrorists when they have initiated a rebellion against him. In August 2013, the cohorts of General Abdul Fattah al Sisi in Egypt massacred Brotherhood members who represented the country's popular politics; now, the country faces a jihadi threat in the Sinai, with regular reports of killings of army personnel. Though neither Burke nor Filiu have noted this, Saudi Arabia is said to be cooperating with Al Qaeda in its conflicts in Syria and Yemen today.
Filiu's book is a polemical work. Written with strong conviction, it is nevertheless supported by a deep knowledge of Arab history. Where his account is weak is in explaining how Arab despotism has encouraged the proliferation of jihad, particularly after the collapse of the Arab Spring. What is heartening, though, is that, in spite of the bleak scenario, the author asserts that the Arab revolution is not over and that the next generation of activists will be better prepared when it confronts the despots.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)